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Abstract. A well known and established model in communication policy in sociology and mar-
keting is that of opinion leadership. It is based on the idea of a two-step flow of communication.
Opinion leaders are actors in a society who are able to affect the behavior of other members of the
society called followers. Hence, opinion leaders might have a considerable impact on the behavior
of markets and other social agglomerations being made up of individual actors choosing among a
number of alternatives. For marketing purposes it appears to be interesting to investigate the effect
of different opinion leader-follower structures in markets or any other collective decision-making
situations in a society.
We study a two-action model in which the members of a society are to choose one action, for
instance, to buy or not to buy a certain joint product, or to vote yes or no on a specific proposal. Each
of the actors has an inclination to choose one of the actions. By definition opinion leaders have some
power over other actors, their followers, and they exercise this power by influencing the behavior
of their followers, i.e. their choice of action. After all actors have chosen their actions, a decision-
making mechanism determines the collective choice resulting out of the individual choices. The
structure of the relations between the actors can be represented by a bipartite digraph. We analyze
such digraphs investigating satisfaction and power distributions within societies with and without
the opinion leaders. Moreover, we study common properties of the satisfaction and power measures
and illustrate our findings and some marketing implications for a society with five members.
JEL Classification: C7, D7
Keywords: Bipartite digraph, influence, inclination, collective choice, opinion leader,
follower, satisfaction, power
1 Introduction
The concept of opinion leadership received considerable attention in sociology and mar-
keting. It rose out of the theory of two-step flow of communication introduced by the
’Lazarsfeld group’ (see e.g. Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955, and Lazarsfeld et al., 1968, [27,
29]). In its most rudimentary form it claims that ‘ideas often flow from radio and print to
the opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections of the population’ (Lazars-
feld et al., 1968, [29]). For instance, Lazarsfeld et al. (1968, [29]) investigated the influence
of the mass communication on the 1940 presidential election campaign in the US. They
found that the voters’ choices were more influenced by actors which they called opinion
leaders than by mass communication and concluded that the communication process is
not a one- but a two-step process. According to this model information distributed by
mass media first reaches the so-called opinion leaders. These are actors who are specified
as highly self-confident with strong opinions. In Lazarsfeld et al. they act as intermedi-
aries between the mass media and the recipients. In general, the latter actors are called
followers. They feel attracted by the opinion leaders holding them in high esteem and are
prepared to accept their opinion for their own behavior. Hence, a major characteristic of
opinion leaders is their exercised power over their followers. After critiques of the model
by the ’Lazarsfeld group’ (see e.g. Bostian, 1970, [6]), Troldahl (1966, [38]) introduced
a modified version of their model called two cycle flow of communication saying that
the two-step flow hypothesis seems to be more adequate as a description of the flow of
influence on beliefs and behavior than as a description of the information flow. Troldahl
distinguishes then between the flow of information and the influence (exercised by opin-
ion leaders). This corresponded to other results in the field (see e.g. Deutschmann and
Danielson, 1960, [11]). The literature on opinion leadership since then has provided a
strong body of knowledge of how and why opinion leaders influence followers choices (see
Hoyer and Stockburger-Sauer, 2007, [25]).
Opinion leaders form an attractive group for marketing activities in business and poli-
tics (see e.g. Hoyer and Stockburger-Sauer, 2007, [25]) as the existence (or non-existence)
of opinion leaders in a society and their relations to their followers may have a consid-
erable impact on the behavior of markets (such as consumer or financial markets), and
other social agglomerations being made up of individual actors choosing among a number
of alternatives (open to them at a given time). For marketing purposes it appears to be
interesting to investigate the effect of different opinion leader-follower structures in mar-
kets or other collective decision-making situations in a society. This includes questions
such as whether it would be worthwhile to establish a new opinion leader in a society or
whether a change in the existing opinion leader-follower relationships can be expected to
make a difference to the society. However, to our best knowledge there exists no study
which addresses this issue on bare theoretical grounds. In this paper we lay the foundation
to fill out this lacunae by introducing a power and satisfaction measure for societies with
opinion leaders1. The former informs us about the power distribution among the members
of the society with respect to their ability to affect the state of the society concerning
a specific outcome, while the latter tells us to which degree members of the society can
be expected to end up with an outcome that they like. We study common properties of
both measures and illustrate our findings and some marketing implications for a society
consisting out of five members.
For our analysis we consider the example of binary choice as it can also be found in
Sinha and Raghavendra (2006, [34]) who study the effect of opinion leaders on market
outcomes. It is assumed that an actor can choose among two alternatives. For instance,
this can be a market in which the actors have to decide whether they should buy or
not buy a joint product, or a voting situation in which the members of the society have
to choose to vote either yes or no on a specific proposal. Note, that from now onwards
we will only refer to a voting situation. However, all results presented in our paper also
1 Note that this research is in some respects also related to work on opinion leaders and the Condorcet Jury
Theorem (see, e.g. Estlund, 1994, [13]), threshold models of collective behavior (see, e.g. Granovetter, 1978, and
Granovetter and Soong, 1986, [21, 22]) and, in more general terms to the literature on network externalities.
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apply to markets. It is assumed that each of the actors has an inclination to choose one
of the actions. By the inclination of an actor we mean an action that this actor would
choose being ‘on its own’, that is, if no influence between the actors takes place. We
assume that there might exist opinion leaders, who have some power over their followers
and exercise this power by influencing the behavior of their followers, i.e. their choice of
action. As a result of this influence, the ability of the follower to determine the outcome
of the collective choice, i.e. its power to do something (with respect to the outcome of
the collective choice) might be affected. The benchmark case is a situation without any
opinion leader. For our decision-making mechanism we assume that the actors in the
society have to decide whether they would like to remain with the status quo in their
society or whether a proposal leading to a new state of the society should be adopted.
We let the latter correspond to choosing the yes-action, and former correspond to the
no-action. We presuppose that the proposal is exogenous and in line with the inherent
idea of opinion leadership that the inclinations of the opinion leaders are becoming public
information prior to the real decision via informal discussions of the proposal. Only after
these discussions actors will (secretly) choose their action, i.e. decide whether they would
like to remain with the status quo or whether they would like to see the proposal being
adopted. This implies that we consider a simultaneous decision-making situation. In our
model each follower is assumed to follow a certain qualified majority (more than half) of
its opinion leaders if these have the same inclination.
In the literature we can find several measures being introduced for analyzing collective
decision-making situations with a possible influence between the actors. For instance,
some measures for arbitrary digraphs have been studied in van den Brink and Borm (2002,
[9]) and van den Brink and Gilles (2000, [10]). Since in the present paper we consider
a opinion leader-follower structure which can be represented by a bipartite digraph, our
model is related to the studies done in [9, 10]. Coming from a slightly different direction
are the works presented in the voting power literature on power indices. One of the
traditional indices is the Rae index (Rae, 1969, [32]) which measures the success of an
actor in a voting situation. An actor is said to have been successful if its vote coincides
with the voting outcome. Such a successful actor can be additionally powerful or decisive.
Decisiveness of an actor is related to other well known power indices, i.e., the absolute
Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1965, [1], see also Dubey and Shapley, 1979, and Owen, 1975,
[12, 31]), and the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954, [33]). They ascribe
power to an actor, i.e. they state that the actor is decisive, if its vote coincides with the
voting outcome, but this outcome would have been different if the voter changed its vote.
While the absolute Banzhaf index is a probabilistic measure of decisiveness under uniform
probability distribution over all vote configurations, the Shapley-Shubik index can be seen
as a probabilistic measure of decisiveness, but for a different probability distribution (for
a probabilistic approach to power indices, see, e.g. Laruelle and Valenciano, 2005, and
Straffin, 1977, 1978, [28, 35, 36]). As we are also concerned with measuring power and
satisfaction distributions, our research is also related to the work on power indices. In
the present paper we analyze satisfaction and power in a digraph by the number of times
the collective choice is the same as the inclination of an actor. Power of an actor in a
bipartite digraph is measured by the number of times the actor has a swing, where by
a swing we mean that an actor by changing its inclination, given the inclinations of the
others, enforces a change in the collective choice.
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model, and in Section
3 we define the measures of power and satisfaction of actors. In Section 4, first the axioms
are presented, and then we prove that the satisfaction and power measures satisfy the
given axioms. In Section 5, we illustrate the introduced measures and the properties of
the measures in question by a society represented by five-actors digraphs. In Section 6, we
draw some conclusions, discuss some possible extensions of the model and future research
agenda. Proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider the following model. There is a specific proposal on which n actors can decide
upon either by choosing the yes- or no-action. Let N = {1, ..., n} denote the set of all
actors forming the society, and let 1 and 0 stand for the choice of the yes and no-action,
respectively. Each actor is assumed to have an inclination to choose either the yes- or no-
action. An inclination vector I = (I1, ..., In) ∈ {1, 0}
n is a vector which kth component, Ik,
is 1 if actor k has the inclination to choose the yes-action, and 0 if it is inclined to choose
the no-action. It is assumed that some actors may have power over others which they
exercise prior to collective choice of this specific proposal, i.e. they influence the decisions
of the other actors by making use of their power over them. As mentioned above we
refer to the actors which have this influence as opinion leaders, and to the actors which
are prepared choose an action according to the inclination of their opinion leaders as
followers. Actors that are neither opinion leaders nor followers are called independent
actors. We assume simultaneous voting, where the inclinations of the opinion leaders are
revealed during informal preliminary discussions. During such preliminary discussions
each follower makes up its mind which decision it will take. Some actors may also change
their inclinations during the preliminary discussions, but we assume that when choosing
their action and after that they do not alter their inclinations. Based on the choice of
action of all actors, a collective choice whether the proposal will be accepted or rejected
is resulting out of a decision-making mechanism being described below.
The structure of such ‘opinion leader-follower’ relations is represented by a bipartite
directed graph (or bipartite digraph) (N,D) with set of nodes N representing the actors
and D ⊂ N × N a binary relation on N . Since we take the set of actors N fixed, we
represent a digraph (N,D) just by its binary relation D. Let SD(k) and PD(k) denote
the set of successors and predecessors of actor k in digraph D, respectively, i.e., for each
k ∈ N ,
SD(k) = {j ∈ N | (k, j) ∈ D}
PD(k) = {j ∈ N | (j, k) ∈ D}.
As we assume that each actor is either an opinion leader, follower or independent actor,
we consider digraphs D such that
|SD(k)| · |PD(k)| = 0 for each k ∈ N (1)
where |X| denotes the cardinality of set X. Let OL(D), FOL(D), and IND(D) denote the
sets of all opinion leaders, followers, and independent actors in digraph D, respectively,
i.e.
OL(D) = {k ∈ N | SD(k) 6= ∅}
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FOL(D) = {k ∈ N | PD(k) 6= ∅}
IND = N \ (OL(D) ∪ FOL(D)).
Therefore, by assumption (1) we have that
OL(D) ∩ FOL(D) = ∅,
and thus the sets OL(D), FOL(D) and IND(D) form a partition of the set N . We denote
the collection of all bipartite digraphs on N , represented by their binary relation, by DN .
We refer to a pair (I,D) with I ∈ {0, 1}n and D a bipartite graph as described above
as an opinion leader-follower collective choice situation. After preliminary discussions, all
actors simultaneously choose their actions. We assume that the actors in OL(D)∪IND(D)
make their choice according to their inclinations. If a follower has just one opinion leader,
it will choose according to the inclination of its opinion leader. If the follower has more
than one opinion leader, then we assume that it will follow a qualified majority of its
opinion leaders. In particular, it will follow its opinion leaders if they all have the same
inclination.
Let V = V (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n denote the choice vector, that is, a vector which kth
component, Vk, is 1 if actor k has chosen the yes-action, and 0 if it has chosen the no-
action. We assume that for every follower it is specified what fraction (more than half) of
its predecessors it will follow. Assuming this fraction to be uniform over the actors, there
exists q ∈ [1
2
, 1), and the choice vector V = V (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n is recursively given by:
Vk = Ik if k ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D),
and for k ∈ FOL(D) :
Vk =
{
x if |{j ∈ PD(k) | Ik = x}| > [q · |PD(j)|]
Ik otherwise,
(2)
where [x] denotes the largest integer not greater than x. According to (2), given (I,D),
if more than the fraction q of the opinion leaders of follower k has the same inclination,
then k will follow these opinion leaders, otherwise it will decide according to its own
inclination. In particular, if q = 1
2
, and half of the opinion leaders of k are inclined to
choose the yes-action and half to choose the no-action, the follower k will follow its own
inclination. For sufficiently large q, actor k follows its opinion leaders only if they are all
unanimous in their inclinations.
After all actors have chosen their actions, a collective choice is resulting according to
the decision-making mechanism in use. The decision-making mechanism is given by the
collective decision function C : {0, 1}n ×DN → 2{0,1} which assigns an outcome to every
pair (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n ×DN . We assume the collective decision function C to be:
– neutral, i.e., C(I,D) = 1 if and only if C(Ic, D) = 0, where Ick = 1 if and only if
Ik = 0;
– anonymous, i.e., for every permutation pi : N → N , C(I,D) = C(pi(I), pi(D)) with
pi(I)k = Ipi(k) and (pi(k), pi(j)) ∈ pi(D) if and only if (k, j) ∈ D.
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Let for x ∈ {0, 1} and V ∈ {0, 1}n
nx(V ) = |{k ∈ N | Vk = x}|
be the number of actors choosing action x. We define the collective decision function by
simple majority voting, i.e., for each (I,D):
C(I,D) =


1 if n1(V (I,D)) > n0(V (I,D))
0 if n0(V (I,D)) > n1(V (I,D))
x ∈ {0, 1} if n1(V (I,D)) = n0(V (I,D)),
(3)
where in the last case, which may occur for an even number of actors, we assign the
outcomes 1 or 0 such that C(I,D) 6= C(Ic, D) and the decision function C is neutral.
3 Measuring satisfaction and power
In this section we define satisfaction and power measures for bipartite digraphs which
represent a collective decision-making situation as described above. In general, a measure
for bipartite digraphs is a function f : DN → Rn which assigns an n-dimensional real
vector to every bipartite digraph on N .
Success of an actor in a voting game means that the voting outcome coincides with
the actor’s vote. Since in our model actors have their inclinations to chose either the
yes- or no-action before they actually choose, we propose to measure the satisfaction of
an actor which is related to how often an actor’s inclination prior to its actual choice
coincides with the collective choice. First, we define satisfaction of an actor under the
given inclination vector, i.e., for each (I,D) ∈ {0, 1}n ×DN and k ∈ N
SAT k(I,D) =
{
1 if C(I,D) = Ik
0 otherwise.
Next, based on satisfaction of a voter under each inclination vector, we define satisfaction
of actor k in a bipartite digraph, which is measured by SAT : DN → Rn given by
SATk(D) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n
SAT k(I,D) for each k ∈ N. (4)
Even more frequently than measuring success, the voting literature studies measures
of power or decisiveness of an actor. Roughly speaking, we ascribe power to a successful
actor in a voting game if given the votes of the others, by changing its vote the actor
changes the voting outcome, i.e. the actor has a swing. Since we consider situations where
the actors have their inclinations before they choose their action, and the power of an
actor is related to its ability to alter the collective choice, we can relate the power of an
actor in this model to its inclination. Consequently, we ascribe power to an actor if the
actor, by changing its inclination alters the collective choice.
Actor k ∈ N has a swing in (I,D) according to collective decision function C if
C(I,D) 6= C(I ′, D) with I ′k 6= Ik and I
′
j = Ij for all j ∈ N \ {k}. We measure power
under the given inclination vector by the number of swings:
POW k(I,D) =
{
1 if k has a swing in (I,D)
0 otherwise.
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Then, power in a digraph is measured by POW : DN → Rn given by
POWk(D) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n
POW k(I,D) for each k ∈ N. (5)
In the next section we will study common properties of the satisfaction and power
measures given by (4) and (5). The only property studied in this paper which is different
for both measures concerns the normalization.
4 Axioms for measures of satisfaction and power based on
following a qualified majority of opinion leaders
Let us consider the measures SAT and POW defined in (4) and (5), respectively. Each
follower is assumed to follow a qualified majority of its opinion leaders, i.e. the choice
vector V is as defined in (2). We consider a neutral and anonymous collective decision
function C as defined in (3).
First, we state the axioms for a measure f : DN → Rn, and then we prove that
SAT and POW satisfy these axioms. The first axiom says that actors with a symmetric
position in the bipartite digraph have the same measure.
Axiom 1 (Symmetry) If SD(k) = SD(j) and PD(k) = PD(j) then fk(D) = fj(D).
According to the second axiom, referred to as power neutrality, if an actor becomes a
sole opinion leader of another actor who was previously independent, then the sum of the
measures of these two actors does not change. In other words, the gain for the opinion
leader goes fully at the cost of the follower2.
Axiom 2 (Power neutrality) Let D,D′ ∈ DN and h, j ∈ N be such that PD(j) = ∅,
h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D) and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Then fh(D
′) + fj(D
′) = fh(D) + fj(D).
The third axiom is the equal or opposite gain property, and states that if a follower gets
one more opinion leader, then the changes in measures of this follower and of its new
opinion leader are either the same or are opposite. In other words, the absolute values of
these changes in measures are the same.
Axiom 3 (Equal or opposite gain property) Let D,D′ ∈ DN and h, j ∈ N be such
that PD(j) 6= ∅, h ∈ OL(D)∪IND(D) and D
′ = D∪{(h, j)}. Then either fh(D
′)−fh(D) =
fj(D
′)− fj(D) or fh(D
′)− fh(D) = fj(D)− fj(D
′).
In a particular case, if a follower follows its opinion leaders only if they are unanimous,
then a stronger version of this axiom can be imposed, saying that the change in measure
of the follower and its new opinion leader is the same. However, this stronger version is
not satisfied by our measures if the qualified majority of the opinion leaders, with an
arbitrary q ∈ [1
2
, 1), is assumed.
2 This type of axiom is introduced in the context of cooperative TU-games in Lehrer (1988, [30]) and Haller
(1994, [23]), and applied to cooperative games with hierarchical permission structures on the set of players in
van den Brink (2000, [8]).
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The fourth axiom, called the opposite gain property for two opinion leaders, says
that if a follower with one opinion leader gets a second opinion leader, then the sum of
measures of the ‘old’ and new opinion leaders does not change. In other words, the change
for the new (second) opinion leader is opposite but in absolute value equal to the change
for the old (first) opinion leader.
Axiom 4 (Opposite gain property for two opinion leaders) Let D,D′ ∈ DN and
h, j, g ∈ N be such that PD(j) = {g}, h ∈ OL(D)∪ IND(D) and D
′ = D∪{(h, j)}. Then
fh(D
′)− fh(D) = fg(D)− fg(D
′).
If a follower follows only unanimous opinion leaders, then a stronger version of this axiom
can be imposed, where the number of the opinion leaders is arbitrary. This stronger
version of the axiom is however violated by our measures with the qualified majority of
the opinion leaders, with an arbitrary q ∈ [1
2
, 1).
The fifth axiom is the dictator property and says that if there is a dictator, i.e. a unique
opinion leader which is followed by all other actors, then the measure of the dictator is
equal to the total number of possible inclination vectors. Note that since we assume that
no actor can be at the same time a follower and an opinion leader, the dictator as defined
above cannot be a follower.
Axiom 5 (Dictator property) If D ∈ DN and h ∈ N is such that SD(h) = N \ {h},
then fh(D) = 2
n.
According to the sixth axiom, called dictated independence, the measure of a follower
with one opinion leader does not change as long as this follower is dictated by a sole
opinion leader.
Axiom 6 (Dictated independence) If D,D′ ∈ DN and k ∈ N are such that |PD(k)| =
|PD′(k)| = 1, then fk(D) = fk(D
′).
As we show later, the measures for satisfaction and power defined in the previous section
both satisfy the above six axioms. They differ with respect to a normalization that is
applied.
In satisfaction normalization, the sum of all measures is equal to the total number of
individual satisfactions over all inclination vectors. On the other hand, in power normal-
ization, the sum of all measures is equal to the total number of swings over all inclination
vectors.
Axiom 7 (Satisfaction normalization) For every D ∈ DN it holds that∑
k∈N
fk(D) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n
∑
k∈N
SAT k(I,D).
Axiom 8 (Power normalization) For every D ∈ DN it holds that∑
k∈N
fk(D) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n
∑
k∈N
POW i(I,D).
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Next, we state the main results which are proved in the Appendix. We show that the
satisfaction measure satisfies Axioms 1 till 7 if the choice vector is defined by (2).
Theorem 1 Let the choice vector V be defined by (2). The satisfaction measure SAT :
DN → Rn defined in (4) satisfies symmetry, power neutrality, the equal or opposite gain
property, the opposite gain property for two opinion leaders, the dictator property, dictated
independence and satisfaction normalization.
We also analyze the properties of the power measure POW . It turns out that the
power measure POW satisfies Axioms 1 till 6 and 8, if the choice vector is defined by (2).
Theorem 2 Let the choice vector V be defined by (2). The power measure POW : DN →
R
n defined in (5) satisfies symmetry, power neutrality, the equal or opposite gain prop-
erty, the opposite gain property for two opinion leaders, the dictator property, dictated
independence and power normalization.
The symmetry, dictator property and satisfaction normalization imply that the measure
SAT also satisfies the dictator domination satisfaction property stating that in case there
is a dictator, i.e. a unique opinion leader which is followed by all other actors, the measure
of each follower is equal to half of the measure of the dictator.
Axiom 9 (Dictator domination satisfaction property) If D ∈ DN and h ∈ N is
such that SD(h) = N \ {h}, then fk(D) =
1
2
fh(D) for all k ∈ N \ {h}.
Similar, the symmetry, dictator property and power normalization imply that the measure
POW satisfies the dictator domination power property, which states that in case there is
a dictator, the measure of each follower is equal to zero.
Axiom 10 (Dictator domination power property) If D ∈ DN and h ∈ N is such
that SD(h) = N \ {h}, then fk(D) = 0 for all k ∈ N \ {h}.
Corollary 1 Let the choice vector V be defined by (2). Then, the satisfaction measure
SAT : DN → Rn defined in (4) satisfies the dictator domination satisfaction property,
and the power measure POW : DN → Rn defined in (5) satisfies the dictator domination
power property.
Finally, one can note that from the proof that SAT satisfies the equal or opposite
gain property (see the proof of Theorem 1 presented in the Appendix) it follows that,
for every D,D′ ∈ DN and h, j ∈ N such that PD(j) 6= ∅, h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D) and
D′ = D∪{(h, j)}, whenever SATh(I,D
′)−SATh(I,D) = SATj(I,D
′)−SATj(I,D) = 1,
the follower j votes according to his own inclination in I ∈ {0, 1}n, i.e., Vj(I,D
′) = Ij.
5 Examples
In order to illustrate the developed measures and obtained results we analyze a society
consisting out of five actors, i.e. N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We assume eight potential opinion
leader-follower structures for this society, each represented by a digraph. For the followers
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we assume three different levels of the qualified majorities of the opinion leaders required
to adapt their own behavior, i.e.,
q =
1
2
, q′ =
2
3
, q′′ =
3
4
.
We analyze the following digraphs:
D0 = ∅ (Figure 1a, no opinion leaders)
D1 = {(2, 1)} (Figure 1b, actor 2 is the sole opinion leader of actor 1)
D2 = {(2, 1), (3, 1)} (Figure 1c, actors 2 and 3 are the opinion leaders of actor 1)
D3 = {(2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1)} (Figure 1d, actors 2, 3 and 4 are the opinion leaders of 1)
D4 = {(2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 1), (5, 1)} (Figure 1e, actors in N \{1} are the opinion leaders of 1)
D5 = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5)} (Figure 1f, actor 1 is a dictator)
D6 = {(1, 2), (3, 4)} (Figure 1g, actor 2 follows 1, actor 4 follows 3)
D7 = {(1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 4)} (Figure 1h, actor 2 follows 1, actors 3 and 5 are the opinion
leaders of 4).
For this setup we show how the number of opinion leaders affects the relations between
actors’ measures of satisfaction and power.
Figures 1a - 1h present the graphs D0 - D7.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Note that in digraphD3, in which actor 1 has three opinion leaders, when following the
qualified majority of its opinion leaders, under q = 1
2
, actor 1 will always decide according
to the inclination of at least two of its opinion leaders with the same inclination. Under
q′ = 2
3
and q′′ = 3
4
, it will follow its opinion leaders only when they are unanimous.
In digraph D4, in which actor 1 has four opinion leaders, under q and q
′ actor 1 will
follow at least three unanimous opinion leaders, but it will decide according to its own
inclination if two of its opinion leaders have the positive inclination, and two have the
negative inclination. Under q′′ agent 1 follows its opinion leaders 2, 3, 4, 5, only if they
are unanimous in their inclinations. When an actor has two opinion leaders, like in D2
and D7, following the qualified majority of the opinion leaders means, of course, following
the opinion leaders only when they both are unanimous.
Tables 1 and 2 present the chosen actions and the collective choices based on the
collective decision function as given in (3) for digraphs D0 till D3, and D4 till D7, respec-
tively. The sign “-” means that for a given I, the result (either the chosen action or the
collective choice) is the same as in D0.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
In Table 3, the measures of actors’ satisfaction and power in situations represented
by digraphs D0 till D7 are shown.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Using the measures calculated in Table 3, we can illustrate the axioms presented
in Section 4. Symmetry is obviously satisfied by both measures in all digraphs. Power
neutrality can be seen when comparing D0 with D1, and D1 with D6. Indeed, for the
latter case, we have:
SAT4(D1) + SAT3(D1) = 20 + 20 = 16 + 24 = SAT4(D6) + SAT3(D6)
and
POW4(D1) + POW3(D1) = 8 + 8 = 0 + 16 = POW4(D6) + POW3(D6).
The measures of satisfaction and power of actors in digraph D5 with actor 1 as a dictator,
satisfy the dictator property, dictator domination satisfaction property, and the dictator
domination power property. Dictated independence can be illustrated with the measures
in question of actor 1 in D1, actors 2 and 4 in D6, and actor 2 in D7, with satisfaction
always equal to 16, and power always equal to 0.
In order to illustrate the equal or opposite gain property, let us first consider digraphs
D2 and D3 with q =
1
2
, where the follower 1, having already two opinion leaders in D2
(players 2 and 3), gets his new opinion leader in D3, voter 4. The following holds:
SAT4(D3)− SAT4(D2) = 24− 20 = 20− 16 = SAT1(D2)− SAT1(D3)
and
POW4(D3)− POW4(D2) = 16− 8 = 8− 0 = POW1(D2)− POW1(D3).
On the other hand, when considering D3 and D4 with q =
1
2
, where player 5 becomes a
new opinion leader of voter 1, we have:
SAT5(D4)− SAT5(D3) = 22− 16 = SAT1(D4)− SAT1(D3)
and
POW5(D4)− POW5(D3) = 12− 0 = POW1(D4)− POW1(D3).
The opposite gain property for two opinion leaders can be shown when comparing D1
with D2, and D6 with D7. Indeed, for the follower 1 in D1 and D2, and actors 2 and 3 as
actor 1’s opinion leaders, we get as follows:
SAT2(D1) + SAT3(D1) = 28 + 20 = 24 + 24 = SAT2(D2) + SAT3(D2)
and
POW2(D1) + POW3(D1) = 24 + 8 = 16 + 16 = POW2(D2) + POW3(D2).
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We want to wind up this section with some observations on the satisfaction, power
and resulting outcome effects of different opinion leader-follower structures. Comparing
D0 with D3 for q
′ and q′′ and D4 for q, q
′ and q′′ from Tables 1 and 2, we can find that for
all actors’ satisfaction and power is always identical, i.e. it has no effect whether an actor
is an opinion leader, follower, or independent actor or whether the society is structured
in one way or the other. Moreover, if actors become opinion leaders or followers they have
no effect on the outcome. Hence, from a marketing perspective for these structures it does
not matter whether there exists no or three or four opinion leaders if there is only up
to one follower. However, to establish an opinion leader in a society without any opinion
leader (moving from D0 to D1) has some effect on the outcome of the collective choice:
it changes in 18.75 percent of the cases, but adding another opinion leader to it (moving
from D1 to D2) decreases the number of cases where the outcome changes. In contrast
to the case without an opinion leader, the outcome alters on in 6.25 percent of the cases.
Hence, the existence of only one opinion leader has a stronger effect to society as having
a second one if there exists only one follower.
6 Concluding remarks
The existence of opinion leaders and their influence over other actors can be seen in
every day life situations: in small as well as in large societies be it in politics or business.
Both satisfaction and power are the very natural measures of agents’ strength or status
in such situations. Since both are different concepts, it is worth to analyze what the
common and different properties of the measures for both concepts display. Although,
as mentioned in the introduction, there exist several related theoretical studies in the
literature on voting models and on networks, the approach which we use in the paper,
i.e. the analysis of opinion leader-follower structures and the properties of the measures
in question has brought up several innovative elements and can also be regarded to
contribute to knowledge in marketing.
However, there are several improvements we could bring to this framework in our
future research. First of all, it will be important to deliver the full axiomatic character-
izations of the satisfaction and power measures, which would show a difference between
the measures from the axiomatic point of view. Moreover, we assume that an actor cannot
be at the same time the opinion leader for some actor(s) and the followers of some other
actor(s). In a future research on this topic, we could try to relax this assumption and
to consider a more general digraph, allowing the sets of predecessors and successors of
a given player to be both non empty. Nevertheless, we must admit that the analysis of
such a general digraph will be far more complicated than the one delivered in the present
paper.
Furthermore, we could apply the same approach to some related models on organi-
zational hierarchies based on subordinates and their superiors (see, e.g., Hammond and
Thomas, 1990, [24]), where an organizational choice is to be made. Although such topics
are naturally related to our present work, we expect that results on the properties of the
measures in question in the superior-subordinate structures will be quite different from
the ones obtained in the present model.
Since we consider the two-action model, a natural and useful generalization of the
framework will be to enlarge the set of possible actions, i.e., to follow some works on
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abstention (see, e.g. Braham and Steffen, 2002, Felsenthal and Machover, 1997, 1998,
2001, Tchantcho et al., 2008, [7, 14–16, 37]), and on multi-choice games (see e.g. Grabisch
and Rusinowska, 2008, and Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993, [20, 26]). Related models are also
games with r alternatives, where the alternatives are not ordered; see Bolger (1986, 1993,
2000, 2002, [2–5]). Also in Freixas (2005a, 2005b, [17, 18]) and Freixas and Zwicker (2003,
[19]), the authors consider decision-making situations, i.e. voting systems, with several
levels of approval in the input and output, where those levels are qualitatively ordered.
They introduce (j, k) simple games, in which each actor expresses one of j possible levels
of input support, and the output consists of one of k possible levels of collective support.
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Appendix
In this appendix we provide all proofs of the results in this paper.
Proof of Theorem 1
It is straightforward that SAT satisfies symmetry and satisfaction normalization.
To show power neutrality, let D,D′ ∈ DN and h, j ∈ N be such that PD(j) = ∅,
h ∈ OL(D)∪IND(D) and D′ = D∪{(h, j)}. If C(I,D) 6= C(I,D′) then it must hold that
actor j had to deviate from its inclination and follow h, and this must result in a change
of collective choice from Ij to Ih, with Ij 6= Ih. So, C(I,D) = Ij 6= Ih and C(I,D
′) =
Ih 6= Ij. Then, SAT j(I,D
′) = SAT j(I,D) − 1 and SAT h(I,D
′) = SAT h(I,D) + 1. So,
SAT j(I,D
′)+SAT h(I,D
′) = SAT j(I,D)+SAT h(I,D). Obviously, this last equality also
holds if C(I,D) = C(I,D′). Thus, with (4) we have SATj(D
′)+SATh(D
′) = SATj(D)+
SATh(D), showing that SAT satisfies power neutrality.
To show the equal or opposite gain property, let D,D′ ∈ DN and h, j ∈ N be such
that PD(j) 6= ∅, h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D) and D
′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. For all inclination vectors
I such that C(I,D) = C(I,D′), obviously it holds SAT j(I,D
′) − SAT j(I,D) = 0 =
SAT h(I,D
′)− SAT h(I,D).
Let I ∈ {0, 1}n be such that C(I,D) 6= C(I,D′). Then, C(I,D) 6= Ih and C(I,D
′) = Ih,
and therefore SAT h(I,D
′)− SAT h(I,D) = 1.
Case I: If [q ·|PD(j)|] = q ·|PD(j)| and C(I,D) 6= C(I,D
′) for some I, then q ·|PD(j)| opin-
ion leaders of j have inclination x = Ih 6= Ij, Vj(I,D) = Ij, C(I,D) = Ij, but Vj(I,D
′) =
Ih, C(I,D
′) = Ih 6= Ij. Then, SAT j(I,D)−SAT j(I,D
′) = 1 = SAT h(I,D
′)−SAT h(I,D),
and with (4) we get SATh(D
′)− SATh(D) = SATj(D)− SATj(D
′).
Case II: If [q ·|PD(j)|] < q ·|PD(j)| and C(I,D) 6= C(I,D
′) for some I, then [q ·|PD(j)|]+1
opinion leaders of j have inclination x 6= Ih = Ij, [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 = [q · (|PD(j)| +
1)], Vj(I,D) 6= Ij, C(I,D) 6= Ij, but Vj(I,D
′) = Ij = Ih and C(I,D
′) = Ij. Then,
SAT j(I,D
′) − SAT j(I,D) = 1 = SAT h(I,D
′) − SAT h(I,D), and with (4) we have
SATh(D
′)− SATh(D) = SATj(D
′)− SATj(D).
Hence, SAT satisfies the equal or opposite gain property.
To show the opposite gain property for two opinion leaders, let D,D′ ∈ DN and
h, j ∈ N be such that PD(j) = {g}, h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D) and D
′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}.
Obviously, if C(I,D) = C(I,D′), then SAT h(I,D
′) − SAT h(I,D) = SAT g(I,D) −
SAT g(I,D
′) = 0. Suppose now that C(I,D) 6= C(I,D′). Then it must hold that actor
j initially had to choose an action against its inclination and now can choose an action
according to its inclination because its new opinion leader h has the same inclination.
So, for g ∈ PD(j) we have C(I,D) = Ig 6= Ij = Ih and C(I,D
′) = Ij = Ih 6= Ig. Then,
SAT h(I,D
′) − SAT h(I,D) = SAT g(I,D) − SAT g(I,D
′) = 1. Thus, with (4) we have
SATh(D
′)− SATh(D) = SATg(D)− SATg(D
′), showing that SAT satisfies the opposite
gain property for two opinion leaders.
The dictator property follows straightforward since a dictator is followed in all 2n
inclination vectors in {0, 1}n, i.e., if SD(h) = N\{h}, then C(I,D) = Ih for all I ∈ {0, 1}
n.
To show dictated independence, note that actor k always chooses an action according
to j’s inclination if PD(k) = {j}. That means that the collective choice is independent
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of actor k’s inclination, i.e. C(I,D) = C(I ′, D) if Ih = I
′
h for all h ∈ N \ {k}. Hence, in
half of the inclination vectors C(I,D) = Ik and in the other half C(I,D) 6= Ik. So, SAT
satisfies dictated independence. 
Proof of Theorem 2
It is straightforward that POW satisfies symmetry and power normalization.
To show power neutrality, let D,D′ ∈ DN and h, j ∈ N be such that PD(j) = ∅,
h ∈ OL(D)∪ IND(D) and D′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}. Since in D′ actor j has to choose an action
according to its unique opinion leader h, j has never a swing inD′, i.e. POWj(D
′) = 0. So,
we have to show that POWh(D
′) = POWh(D)+POWj(D). We distinguish the following
three cases.
(i) If h does not have a swing in (I,D) but j has a swing in (I,D), then h has a swing
in (I,D′), i.e. if POWh(I,D) = 0 and POWj(I,D) = 1 then POWh(I,D
′) = 1.
(ii) If h has a swing in (I,D), then h has a swing in (I,D′), i.e. if POWh(I,D) = 1
then POWh(I,D
′) = 1. If, moreover, also j has a swing in (I,D) then h has also a swing
in (I ′, D′) with I ′j = I
′
h 6= Ih = Ij, i.e. if POWh(I,D) = 1 and POWj(I,D) = 1 then
POWh(I
′, D′) = 1.
(iii) Finally, if h does not have a swing in (I,D) and j does not have a swing in
(I,D), then the only possibility for h to have a swing in (I,D′) is as described in the
last case before. So, POWh(D
′) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n POW h(I,D
′) =
∑
I∈{0,1}n(POW h(I,D) +
POW j(I,D)), showing that POW satisfies power neutrality.
To show the equal or opposite gain property, let D,D′ ∈ DN and h, j ∈ N be such
that PD(j) 6= ∅, h ∈ OL(D)∪IND(D) and D
′ = D∪{(h, j)}. Note that POWh(I,D) = 1
implies that POWh(I,D
′) = 1.
Case I: Suppose that [q · |PD(j)|] = q · |PD(j)|. We distinguish the following subcases:
(i) If I ∈ {0, 1}n is such that [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 opinion leaders of j have the same
inclination, then POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) = 0 and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(ii) If I is such that less than [q · |PD(j)|] opinion leaders of j have the inclination
x ∈ {0, 1} and less than [q · |PD(j)|] opinion leaders have the inclination y ∈ {0, 1} \ {x},
then POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(iii) Suppose that I ∈ {0, 1}n is such that [q · |PD(j)|] opinion leaders have the same
inclination, say x ∈ {0, 1}, and less than [q · |PD(j)|] have the different inclination y ∈
{0, 1} \ {x}.
(a) If Ij = x 6= y = Ih, then POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) and POWh(I,D) =
POWh(I,D
′).
(b) Let x = Ih 6= y = Ij. If POWj(I,D) = 1, then POWj(I,D) − POWj(I,D
′) = 1
and POWh(I,D
′) − POWh(I,D) = 1. Moreover, for I
′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that x = I ′j =
I ′h 6= y, I
′
k = Ik for k 6∈ {j, h}, POWj(I
′, D) − POWj(I
′, D′) = 1 and POWh(I
′, D′) −
POWh(I
′, D) = 0, but for I ′′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that x 6= I ′′j = I
′′
h = y, I
′′
k = Ik for k 6∈ {j, h},
POWj(I
′′, D)− POWj(I
′′, D′) = 0 and POWh(I
′′, D′)− POWh(I
′′, D) = 1.
In a similar way we can consider the case when [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 opinion leaders of j have
one inclination, and [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 opinion leaders have the other inclination.
Thus, with (5), we get POWh(D
′)− POWh(D) = POWj(D)− POWj(D
′).
Case II: Suppose that [q · |PD(j)|] < q · |PD(j)|, and [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 = [q · (|PD(j)|+ 1)].
We distinguish the following cases.
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(i) If I ∈ {0, 1}n is such that [q · |PD(j)|] + 2 opinion leaders of j have the same
inclination, then POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) = 0 and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(ii) If I ∈ {0, 1}n is such that [q · |PD(j)|] (or less) opinion leaders of j have one
inclination and less than [q · |PD(j)|] opinion leaders have the other inclination, then
POWj(I,D) = POWj(I,D
′) and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(iii) Suppose I is such that [q · |PD(j)|] + 1 opinion leaders have the same inclination,
say x ∈ {0, 1}. Then POWj(I,D) = 0. There are several possibilities.
(a) If Ij = x = Ih 6= y, then POWj(I,D
′) = 0 and POWh(I,D) = POWh(I,D
′).
(b) Suppose x = Ih 6= y = Ij. Then, POWj(I,D
′) = 0 and if, moreover, POWh(I,D) =
1, we have POWh(I,D
′) = 1. Further, for I ′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that x 6= I ′j = I
′
h =
y, I ′k = Ik for k 6∈ {j, h}, POWh(I
′, D) = POWh(I
′, D′) = 1 and POWj(I
′, D′) =
POWj(I
′, D) = 0, and for I ′′ ∈ {0, 1}n such that x = I ′′j 6= I
′′
h = y, I
′′
k = Ik for k 6∈ {j, h},
POWj(I
′′, D) = POWj(I
′′, D′) = 0 and POWh(I
′′, D′) = POWh(I
′′, D). Suppose now
that POWh(I,D) = 0. If POWh(I,D
′) = 0 as well, then POWh(I,D
′)−POWh(I,D) =
POWj(I,D
′)−POWj(I,D), and the same holds for I
′ and I ′′. If POWh(I,D
′) = 1, then
POWh(I,D
′)−POWh(I,D) = 1 and POWj(I,D
′)−POWj(I,D) = 0, POWh(I
′, D′)−
POWh(I
′, D) = 1 and POWj(I
′, D′)− POWj(I
′, D) = 1, but
POWh(I
′′, D′)− POWh(I
′′, D) = 0 and POWj(I
′′, D′)− POWj(I
′′, D) = 1.
Thus, with (5), POWh(D
′)− POWh(D) = POWj(D
′)− POWj(D).
Hence, POW satisfies the equal or opposite gain property.
To show the opposite gain property for two opinion leaders, let D,D′ ∈ DN and
h, j, g ∈ N be such that PD(j) = {g}, h ∈ OL(D) ∪ IND(D) and D
′ = D ∪ {(h, j)}.
Note that POWg(I,D) = 0 implies that POWg(I,D
′) = 0. Moreover, POWh(I,D) = 1
implies POWh(I,D
′) = 1.
Note that it is impossible that at the same time POWh(I,D
′) + POWg(I,D
′) ≥ 1
and POWh(I,D) + POWg(I,D) = 0. Moreover, it is impossible that at the same time
POWh(I,D
′) + POWg(I,D
′) ≤ 1 and POWh(I,D) + POWg(I,D) = 2.
Furthermore, note that [I ∈ {0, 1}n is such that
POWh(I,D
′) + POWg(I,D
′) = 2 and POWh(I,D) + POWg(I,D) = 1] if and only if
[Ih = Ig 6= Ij and for I
′ ∈ {0, 1}n given by I ′h = I
′
g 6= Ig(= Ih), and I
′
k = Ik for all
k ∈ N \ {g, h} (and thus I ′j = I
′
h = I
′
g), satisfies POWh(I
′, D′) + POWg(I
′, D′) = 0 and
POWh(I
′, D) + POWg(I
′, D) = 1].
Hence, POW satisfies the opposite gain property for two opinion leaders.
Since a dictator has a swing in every inclination vector, POW satisfies the dictator
property. Since an actor with a unique opinion leader never has a swing, POW satisfies
dictated independence. 
Proof of Corollary 1
Let D ∈ DN and h ∈ N be a dictator, i.e., SD(h) = N \ {h}.
From symmetry, the dictator property and satisfaction normalization, we have for each
k ∈ N \ {h},
∑
j∈N SATj(D) = SATh(D) + (n − 1)SATk(D) = 2
n + (n − 1)SATk(D),
and
∑
I∈{0,1}n
∑
j∈N SAT j(I,D) = 2
n + (n− 1)2n−1. Hence,
SATk(D) = 2
n−1 = 1
2
SATh(D), showing that SAT satisfies the dictator domination
satisfaction property.
17
From symmetry, the dictator property and power normalization, we have for each
k ∈ N \{h},
∑
j∈N POWj(D) = POWh(D)+(n−1)POWk(D) = 2
n+(n−1)POWk(D),
and
∑
I∈{0,1}n
∑
j∈N POW j(I,D) = 2
n, and therefore POWk(D) = 0, showing that POW
satisfies the dictator domination power property. 
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Figure 1: Digraphs D0 - D7
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I = V (I, D0) C(I, V ) V (I, D1) C(I, V ) V (I, D2) C(I, V ) V (I, D3) C(I, V ) V (I, D3) C(I, V )
with q with q with q′, q′′ with q′, q′′
(0,0,0,0,0) 0 - - - - - - - -
(1,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) -
(0,1,0,0,0) 0 (1,1,0,0,0) - - - - - - -
(0,0,1,0,0) 0 - - - - - - - -
(0,0,0,1,0) 0 - - - - - - - -
(0,0,0,0,1) 0 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,0,0,0) 0 - - - - (0,1,0,0,0) - - -
(1,0,1,0,0) 0 (0,0,1,0,0) - - - (0,0,1,0,0) - - -
(1,0,0,1,0) 0 (0,0,0,1,0) - (0,0,0,1,0) - (0,0,0,1,0) - - -
(1,0,0,0,1) 0 (0,0,0,0,1) - (0,0,0,0,1) - (0,0,0,0,1) - (0,0,0,0,1) -
(0,1,1,0,0) 0 (1,1,1,0,0) 1 (1,1,0,0,0) 1 (1,1,1,0,0) 1 - -
(0,1,0,1,0) 0 (1,1,0,1,0) 1 - - (1,1,0,1,0) 1 - -
(0,1,0,0,1) 0 (1,1,0,0,1) 1 - - - - - -
(0,0,1,1,0) 0 - - - - (1,0,1,1,0) 1 - -
(0,0,1,0,1) 0 - - - - - - - -
(0,0,0,1,1) 0 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,1,0,0) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,0,1,0) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,0,0,1) 1 - - - - (0,1,0,0,1) 0 - -
(1,0,1,1,0) 1 (0,0,1,1,0) 0 - - - - - -
(1,0,1,0,1) 1 (0,0,1,0,1) 0 - - (0,0,1,0,1) 0 - -
(1,0,0,1,1) 1 (0,0,0,1,1) 0 (0,0,0,1,1) 0 (0,0,0,1,1) 0 - -
(0,1,1,1,0) 1 (1,1,1,1,0) - (1,1,1,1,0) - (1,1,1,1,0) - (1,1,1,1,0) -
(0,1,1,0,1) 1 (1,1,1,0,1) - (1,1,1,0,1) - (1,1,1,0,1) - - -
(0,1,0,1,1) 1 (1,1,0,1,1) - - - (1,1,0,1,1) - - -
(0,0,1,1,1) 1 - - - - (1,0,1,1,1) - - -
(1,1,1,1,0) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,1,0,1) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,1,0,1,1) 1 - - - - - - - -
(1,0,1,1,1) 1 (0,0,1,1,1) - - - - - - -
(0,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) -
(1,1,1,1,1) 1 - - - - - - - -
Table 1. Votes and collective decisions for digraphs D0 - D3
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I V (I, D4) C(I, V ) V (I, D4) C(I, V ) V (I, D5) C(I, V ) V (I, D6) C(I, V ) V (I, D7) C(I, V )
with q, q′ with q, q′ with q′′ with q′′
(0,0,0,0,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - - - - -
(1,0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,0,0,0) - (1,1,0,0,0) -
(0,1,0,0,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) -
(0,0,1,0,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,1,1,0) - (0,0,1,0,0) -
(0,0,0,1,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) -
(0,0,0,0,1) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - - - - -
(1,1,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0,0) - - - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 - - - -
(1,0,1,0,0) (0,0,1,0,0) - - - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,1,1,0) 1 (1,1,1,0,0) 1
(1,0,0,1,0) (0,0,0,1,0) - - - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,0,0,0) - (1,1,0,0,0) -
(1,0,0,0,1) (0,0,0,0,1) - - - (1,1,1,1,1) 1 (1,1,0,0,1) 1 (1,1,0,0,1) 1
(0,1,1,0,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,1,1,0) - (0,0,1,0,0) -
(0,1,0,1,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,0) -
(0,1,0,0,1) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,1) - (0,0,0,0,1) -
(0,0,1,1,0) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - - - - -
(0,0,1,0,1) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,1,1,1) 1 (0,0,1,1,1) 1
(0,0,0,1,1) - - - - (0,0,0,0,0) - (0,0,0,0,1) - - -
(1,1,1,0,0) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,0) - - -
(1,1,0,1,0) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,0,0,0) 0 (1,1,0,0,0) 0
(1,1,0,0,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - - - - -
(1,0,1,1,0) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,0) - (1,1,1,1,0) -
(1,0,1,0,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) -
(1,0,0,1,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,0,0,1) - (1,1,0,1,1) -
(0,1,1,1,0) (1,1,1,1,0) - - - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,1,1,0) 0 (0,0,1,1,0) 0
(0,1,1,0,1) (1,1,1,0,1) - - - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,1,1,1) - (0,0,1,1,1) -
(0,1,0,1,1) (1,1,0,1,1) - - - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,0,0,1) 0 (0,0,0,1,1) 0
(0,0,1,1,1) (1,0,1,1,1) - - - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 - - - -
(1,1,1,1,0) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - - - - -
(1,1,1,0,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) -
(1,1,0,1,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,0,0,1) - - -
(1,0,1,1,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) -
(0,1,1,1,1) (1,1,1,1,1) - (1,1,1,1,1) - (0,0,0,0,0) 0 (0,0,1,1,1) - (0,0,1,1,1) -
(1,1,1,1,1) - - - - (1,1,1,1,1) - - - - -
Table 2. Votes and collective decisions for digraphs D4 - D7
f(D) = SAT (D) POW (D)
D =
D∅ (22,22,22,22,22) (12,12,12,12,12)
D1 (16,28,20,20,20) (0,24,8,8,8)
D2 (20,24,24,20,20) (8,16,16,8,8)
D3 with q (16,24,24,24,16) (0,16,16,16,0)
D3 with q
′, q′′ (22,22,22,22,22) (12,12,12,12,12)
D4 with q, q
′ (22,22,22,22,22) (12,12,12,12,12)
D4 with q
′′ (22,22,22,22,22) (12,12,12,12,12)
D5 (32,16,16,16,16) (32,0,0,0,0)
D6 (24,16,24,16,24) (16,0,16,0,16)
D7 (24,16,24,16,24) (16,0,16,0,16)
Table 3. Satisfaction and power in digraphs D0 - D7
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